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REFUSALS TO LICENSE UNDER EUROPEAN UNION
COMPETITION LAW AFTER MICROSOFT
Mauro Squitieri*
INTRODUCTION
The restriction on the exercise of intellectual property rights ("IPRs") through the
application of antitrust law has been a long and constantly evolving issue.' There is no doubt
that IPRs may interfere with rules aimed at safeguarding the free movement of goods and
those intended to protect competition. There is a contrast between legislation that grants IPR
holders ability to regulate the circulation or use of the protected goods and the fundamental
principles of antitrust law. The latter tends to prevent the creation and exploitation of monopolistic powers.
When the exclusivity granted to IPRs owners extends beyond mere legal prerogative,
resulting in the creation of a real market power, refusals to license are likely to impose losses
on society in terms of efficiency. The inability to access the protected creations frustrates the
ambitions of possible follow-on innovators, thus preventing or delaying the emergence of
innovative products.
Conversely, the attenuating of the protection conferred by IPRs, in addition to underthe
value of legal certainty, could lead to a reduction of the incentives for companies
mining
to invest and innovate. Further, this attenuation lessens the pressure that induces rivals to
develop alternative facilities and to pursue competition based upon innovation, rather than the
passive, and sometimes parasitic, adherence to the results of others' efforts. In addition, in the
realm of the markets of high technology products, some commentators have expressed doubts
about the aptness of the current competition rules to ensure efficient and timely antitrust enforcement, given that they were designed in an2 earlier period with reference to industries
significantly different from those existing today.
It is not uncommon that ownership of an IPR gives the holder a dominant position,
provided that the product and the market tend to coincide. When the ownership of an exclusive fight assigns such a dominant position, a refusal to license can lead to the exploitation of
customers and the hindrance of competition in different ways, depending upon the nature of
* Ph.D. Bocconi University (Milan, Italy), LL.M. Fordham University (New York, U.S.A.) - Fulbright

Scholar, LL.M. University of Essex (Colchester, U.K.). Partner at Squitieri & Selvaggiuolo International Legal
and Commercial Consulting.
I An extensive literature exists regarding the relationship between antitrust law and intellectual property law.
To cite the most recent, focusing in particular upon the European legislation, see Paul Nihoul, The Limitation of
Intellectual Property in the Name of Competition, 32 FORDAM INT'L L.J. 489 (2009); STEVEN D. ANDERMAN
ET AL., THE INTERFACE BETWEEN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS AND COMPETITION POLICY (Steven D.
Andeman ed., 2007); JONATHAN D. C. TURNER, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND EU COMPETITION LAW (2008).

2 In particular, the characteristics of the modern economy consist in the rapid obsolescence of products and the
extreme dynamism of the high-tech industry, which generate, as a consequence, unstable market shares and
changing scenarios, so that any external corrective action is superfluous or untimely and inclined to alter the
process of innovation negatively. See David J. Teece & Mary Coleman, The Meaning of Monopoly: Antitrust
Analysis in High-Technology Industries, 43 ANTITRUST BULL. 801 (1998); David Balto & Robert Pitofsky,
Antitrust and High-Tech Industries: The New Challenge, 43 ANTITRUST BULL. 583 (1998).
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the abuse. Among these variants, the present work aims at investigating whether non-concerted refusals to share protected resources lessen competition as their object or effect. This
study will focus, in particular, on the unilateral refusal to grant licenses to competitors and the
solutions devised by European Union ("EU")3 jurisprudence to balance the different interests
encompassed in PRs and competition laws.
After briefly examining the legal context created by the Magill4 and IMS 5 cases, this
work will focus in more detail upon the decision of the European Commission 6 and the judgment of the Court of First Instance 7 (the "CFI") in the Microsoft case, paying particular attention to the issue of interoperability. Finally, by analyzing the case law described above, this
article examines the jurisprudential iter that led to a comprehensive discipline of the refusal to
license in the context of the EU legal system.
THE JURISPRUDENTIAL CONTEXT
In recent years, the antitrust activity of the EU has increasingly dealt with the controversial relationship between protecting competition and safeguarding IPRs. This debate has
been absent from the antitrust literature for nearly half a century, but only in recent years have
IPRs taken a prominent place in the economies of many countries. Therefore, the need to
solve the controversy has now become more urgent, especially considering the increase in
antitrust investigations relating to industries producing information-based products protected
by IPRs.
In Europe, the debate was officially opened with the Magill and IMS cases and was
subsequently fomented by the latest Microsoft case. These decisions have prominently highlighted the problem of clearly defining the boundaries between two different sets of rights: the
right to protect intellectual property ("IP") and the rights stemming from antitrust laws.
The Magill Case
Within the broad discussion of the delicate relationship between antimonopoly rules
and the discipline of IP, the Magill case marks a significant moment in the jurisprudential
development of that issue. It is the first case in which a practice related to a copyright has
8
been sanctioned in terms of abuse of dominant position.
3 Following the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon Amending the Treaty on European Union on December

1, 2009 and the Treaty Establishing the European Community, December 13, 2007, 2007 O.J. (C 306) 1
[hereinafter Treaty of Lisbon], the "European Community" was definitively renamed "European Union" and the
"Court of First Instance" was given the name of "General Court". As all of the jurisprudence and legislation
cited in this paper were formulated before the Treaty of Lisbon entered into force, the present work will mostly
refer to the European Community, instead of the European Union, and to the Court of First Instance, instead of
the General Court.
4 Joined Cases C-241 & C-242/91 P, Radio Telefis Eireann v. Comm'n of the Eur. Cmtys., 1995 E.C.R. 1-743
[hereinafter Magill].
5 Case C-418/01, IMS Health GmbH & Co. OHG v. NDC Health GmbH & Co. KG, 2004 E.C.R. 1-5039
[hereinafter IMS].
6 Commission Decision 2007/53/EC, 4 C.M.L.R. 965 (2005) [hereinafter Microsoft Decision).
7 Case T-201/04, Microsoft Corp. v. Comm'n of the Eur. Cmtys., 2007 E.C.R. I1-3601 [hereinafter Microsoft],
on appeal from Microsoft Decision, 4 C.M.L.R. 965 (2005).
8 For an analysis of the Magill case, see, e.g., Simon M. Taylor, Copyright versus Right to Compete: The
Judgment of the ECJ in Magill, 1(3) Comp. TELECOMM. L. REv. 99 (1995); H. H. Paul Lugard, ECJ Upholds
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This case concerned the refusal of Radio Telefis Eireann ("RTE"), the operator of
three Irish television stations, to provide programs of their weekly schedules for radio and
television broadcasts to an independent publisher (Magill), for publication in a weekly general
guide that, at the time, was a product that did not exist on the market. Since such schedules
were protected by copyright, publishing rights were reserved to separate publications owned
by RTE itself or granted under a royalty-free license to newspapers, which provided specific
terms governing the reproduction of the information.
The existence of a copyright gave RTE a dominant position in the market and the
freedom to decide the individuals to whom the stations would license the television schedules
and the raw information therein contained. In particular, RTE availed itself of national laws
for the protection of copyright in order to prevent Magill from publishing the information on a
9
weekly basis. However, the European Court of Justice, with jurisdiction over the matter,
ruled that the protection of a copyright cannot be exercised in a manner and under circumstances manifestly contrary to the competition rules laid down in Articles 81 and 82 of the
Treaty Establishing the European Community (the "EC Treaty").' 0 In this case, the potential
demand from consumers for a new product (a journal encompassing all television programs
on a weekly basis) and the complete lack of an objective reason for the denial (the same
program schedules were offered to newspapers without any charge) formed a reasonable
ground for identifying the existence of an abuse of dominant position."
12
The Magill case can be seen as an application of the "essential facility doctrine,"
since the decision can be explained by the particular circumstances of the case, which coin-

Magill: It Sounds Nice in Theory, But How Does It Work in Practice?,6 EUR. Bus. L. REV. 231 (1995); Peter
Crowther, Compulsory Licensing of Intellectual Property Rights, 20 EUR. L. REv. 521 (1995).
9 The Magill case went before the European Court of Justice on appeal from Case T-69/89, Radio Telefis
Eireann v. Comm'n of the Eur. Cmtys., 1991 E.C.R. 1991 11-485, and Case T-76/89, Independent Television
Publications Ltd v. Comm'n of the Eur. Cmtys., 1991 E.C.R. 11-575, before the Court of First Instance, on
further appeal from Commission Decision 89/205/EEC, 1989 O.J. (L 78) 43.
10Treaty Establishing the European Community, November 10, 1997, 1997 O.J. (C 340) 3 [hereinafter EC
Treaty]. Following the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, Art. 81 and Art. 82 of the EC Treaty have been
transposed respectively in Art. 101 and Art. 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, May
9, 2008, 354, 2008 O.J. (C 115) 47 [hereinafter the TFEU]. In the present work, it is preferable to refer to the
former numbering, as all of the cited jurisprudence and legislation were formulated before the Treaty of Lisbon
entered into force. However, any reference to Art. 81 and Art. 82 of the EC Treaty is intended to refer to Art.
101 and Art. 102 of the TFEU respectively. For the same reasons, the present work will mostly refer to the
European Community, instead of the European Union, and to the Court of First Instance, instead of the General
Court.
11 See Magill, 1995 E.C.R. 1-743, 822-25.
12 The "essential facility doctrine" characterizes a particular kind of monopolization claim, whereby a company
controlling a qualifying "essential facility" must provide non-discriminatory access to it to its competitors. The
doctrine originated in the United States, where the case law set forth four elements necessary to establish
liability under the essential facilitiy doctrine: 1) control of the essential facility by a monopolist; 2) a
competitor's inability practically or reasonably to duplicate the essential facility; 3) the denial of the use of the
facility to a competitor; and 4) the feasibility of providing the facility. See Verizon Communications, Inc. v.
Trinko, 124 S.Ct. 872, 881 (2004) (asserting that the Supreme Court never recognized the essential facility
doctrine, though it declined "to recognize it or to repudiate it" in this specific case); MCI v. AT&T, 708 F.2d
1081, 1132 (7th Cir. 1983); Hecht v. Pro-Football, Inc., 570 F.2d 982, 992-93 (D.C. Cir. 1977). In Europe, the
Commission used for the first time the expression "essential facilities" in 1992 (Commission Decision 94/19/
EC, 1994 O.J. (L 15) 8 [hereinafter Sealink]), although application of the doctrine can be found in earlier
decisions (see, e.g. Commission Decision 92/213/EEC, 1992 O.J. (L 96) 34 (British Midland v. Aer Lingus)). In
Sealink, the Commission ruled that:
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cide with the requirements that are commonly considered necessary for its application.
Firstly, the raw information regarding television schedules constituted a unique resource in the
market that Magill could not duplicate independently because of the copyright held by the
broadcasting companies. Secondly, such information was essential to enable Magill to operate in the market. Finally, the result was a "new" product, and the exercise of a copyright by
RTE was a permanent obstacle to Magill's entry into the market. Against this background,
the Court of Justice stressed that a compulsory license 13 may be imposed under Article 82 of
the EC Treaty only in exceptional circumstances, where, as in this case, PRs are used by the
holder in a way to achieve anticompetitive results that cannot be justified on the basis of the
proper function that the law prescribes. 14
The IMS Case
More recently, the European Court of Justice revisited the essential facility doctrine
in the IMS case, which relied upon the doctrine to justify the imposition of a compulsory
license.' 5 The IMS case, which originated from a copyright infringement at a national level,
was treated by the European Commission as a measure amounting to an abuse of dominant

position in breach of Article 82 of the EC Treaty. 16 The alleged infringement took place in
Germany by the Intercontinental Marketing Services Health Inc. ("IMS Health"), a world
leader in providing information on the pharmaceutical and healthcare industry. IMS Health
was active in nearly one hundred nations, including Germany, through its subsidiary brand,
IMS GmbH & Co. OHG. The claimant was National Data Corporation Health Information
Services ("NDC"), a North American company, which also operated in the supply of informaAn undertaking which occupies a dominant position in the provision of an essential
facility and itself uses that facility (i.e. a facility or infrastructure, without access to which
competitors cannot provide services to their customers), and which refuses other
companies access to that facility without objective justification or grants access to
competitors only on terms less [favorable] than those which it gives its own services,
infringes Article [82 of the EC Treaty].
Sealink, 1992 O.J. (L 96) 34, 66.
13 A "compulsory license" is a measure limiting IPRs and compels the IPR owner to grant use of its patent,
copyright, or other exclusive right to other individual or legal persons, including rivals. On See, e.g., Donna M.
Gitter, The Conflict in the European Community Between Competition Law and Intellectual Property Rights: A
Call for Legislative Clarification of the Essential Facilities Doctrine, 40 Am. Bus. L.J. 217 (2003); Peter
Crowther, Compulsory Licensing of Intellectual Property Rights, 20 EUR. L. REv. 521 (1995).
14 See Magill, 1995 E.C.R. 1-808, U 48-58.
15 See generally Indigo Brinker, Essential Facility Doctrine and Intellectual Property law: Where Does Europe
Stand in the Aftermath of "IMS Health" Case?, 31 Fordham Corp. L. Inst. 137 (2004); Henrik Meinberg, From
Magill to IMS Health: The New Product Requirement and the Diversity of Intellectual Property Rights, 28(7)
EUR. INTELL. PRop. REv. 398 (2006); Christopher Stothers, IMS Health and its Implicationsfor Compulsory

Licensing in Europe, 26(10) EUR. INTELL. PRop. REv. 467 (2004).
16 See Commission Decision 2002/165/EC, 2002 O.J. (L 59) 18 [hereinafter IMS Decision]. Subsequently, by
application lodged at the Registry of the Court of First Instance (the "CFI"), IMS Health brought an action
seeking the annulment of the decision and the suspension of the operation of the Commission's Decision (Case
T-184/01, 2005 E.C.R. 11-817). By an Order of October 26, 2001 in case T-184/01R, the President of the CFI
suspended the execution of Commission Decision 2002/165/EC until such time as the CH had given judgment
in the main action. By application lodged at the Court Registry on December 12, 2001 under the reference C481/01 P(R), NDC Health Corporation appealed the abovementioned order of the President of the CFI. By an
Order of April 11, 2002 in case C-48 1/01P(R), the President of the European Court of Justice dismissed NDC's
appeal.
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tion and specialized in the pharmaceutical and health industry. More recently, NDC began its
expansion in Europe.
The case arose out of the provision of data on regional sales of pharmaceutical products in Germany. Here, as in some other countries, such data (used by pharmaceutical companies to set their own sales and to pay sales representatives) was collected by IMS Health
according to a predefined segmentation known as "brick structure." This system, as described
by the European Commission, consisted of a grid superimposed on the map of a country
containing, inter alia, the following data: postal codes, information from national statistical
offices (e.g. political boundaries, number of residents), distribution of physicians and pharmacies, maps (topographic and road), and information on regional associations for medical
billing. 17
The purpose of this zoning was to allow the supplying of data, broken down on the
basis of small functional areas (the "brick"), while, at the same time, preventing the identification of sales to individual pharmacies, which would conflict with the protection of personal
data.' 8 The brick structure was formed by areas identified through a seven-digit number, of
which only the first five numbers, representing the regional and local boundaries, were publicly known, while the last two digits formed a consecutive number which identified the area
within a given Landkreis or Stadtkreis.19 The brick structure was, therefore, a complex
method of organizing a database that was protected by copyright. The structure prevalently
used, which encompassed 1,860 areas, was developed by IMS Health, which also held the
20
copyright on this structure.
For a variety of reasons, this system of data collection became a defacto standard in
the market. First, it was designed to take maximum account of the needs of its users. In fact,
its development was the result of collaboration between IMS Health and the pharmaceutical
companies. Due to its large diffusion, the system became difficult to replace because pharmaceutical companies needed to monitor the data over time, and the maintenance of that system
became necessary to give meaning to the comparison of data on a chronological basis. In
addition, the system also showed network effects because the companies needed to compare
their data with those of competitors. IMS Health, therefore, was considered by the European
Commission as an undertaking in a dominant position in the German market of data services
concerning regional sales in Germany. In this market, IMS Health had only two competitors,
and one of them, NDC Health, vainly requested a license of the 1,860 brick structure, considering it a prerequisite for effective competition in the market for regional sales data.
It should be noted that the European Court of Justice intended to emphasize the
continuity of its jurisprudence on the point at issue. In fact, the Court presented the decision
22
21
as an application of the provisions in earlier rulings (Volvo , Bronner and Magill) to the
specific facts of IMS. The Court's rationale remained unchanged from the previous cases, and
was based upon the assumption that the refusal to grant a license, even if coming from a
17 See IMS Decision, 2002 O.J. (L 59) 11 17-2 1.
18 Id.
19 The first two identified the Bundesland, the third the Regierungsbezirk (political boundary), and the other
two the Landkreis or Stadtkreis (metropolitan area). Id . 19.
20 IMS Decision, 2002 O.J. (L 59) 9J 17-21.
21 Case 238/87, AB Volvo v. Erik Veng (UK) Ltd., 1988 E.C.R. 6211.
22 Case C-7/97, Oscar Bronner GmbH & Co. KG v. Mediaprint Zeitungs- und Zeitschriftenverlag GmbH & Co.
KG, 1998 E.C.R. 1-7791 [hereinafter Bronner].
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company in a dominant position, did not in itself constitute an abuse of that dominant position. With that said, this could become an abuse under special circumstances.
Given the abovementioned premises, the Court stated that:
[I]n order for the refusal by an undertaking which owns a copyright to give
access to a product or service indispensable for carrying on a particular
business to be treated as abusive, it is sufficient that three cumulative conditions be satisfied, namely, that that refusal is preventing the emergence of
a new product for which there is a potential consumer demand, that it is
unjustified and such as to exclude any competition on a secondary
23
market.
Some aspects of this premise require closer analysis. As for the notion of "essential," it is once again stressed that, although a license under any IPR can be considered an
essential facility, the refusal to allow access to it does not ipsofacto constitute an abuse. For
an abuse to occur, the three conditions listed above must be satisfied.
The Court failed to make any specific comments regarding the second of these conditions, namely the lack of a legitimate basis. Rather, the Court emphasized that a justified
refusal must be based upon "objective considerations."2 4 The broad language suggests that
the Court preferred to reserve the possibility of subsequent individual assessments of specific
IPRs in order to appraise them in light of other interests of a different nature encompassed in
the EC Treaty.
In contrast, the Court articulated with greater clarity its reasoning as to the first and
third conditions. In particular, it focused upon the interpretation given by the Commission,
which amounted to a strong revitalization of the notion of "secondary market."' 2 5 The Court
ruled that "it is sufficient that a potential market or even hypothetical market can be identified, ' 2 6 and, for a secondary market to be recognized, "it is determinative that two different
stages of production may be identified and that they are interconnected, inasmuch as the upstream product is indispensable for the supply of the downstream product."'27 In this context,
it is appropriate to question the level of abstraction of the input market. It appears that the
upstream market, in this case, was rather virtual, as IMS Health developed the brick structure
for the sole purpose of producing its own sales reports. This situation differs markedly from
the Magill case, in which the television listings were a derivative product of the broadcasting
activities and would have existed even if the broadcasters had not published their own
magazines.28 In this regard, the Commission's decision in IMS has been criticized by some
commentators. 2 9 According to the Commission's reasoning, a relevant upstream market
23 IMS Health, 2004 E.C.R. 1-5039,
24
25
26

38.
See id. 51.
See IMS Decision, 2002 O.J. (L 59) 18, 91 183-84.
IMS Health, 2004 E.C.R. 1-5039, 44.

27 Id. at 5084. See also James S. Venit, Article 82 EC: Exceptional Circumstances: The IP/Antitrust Interface
after IMS Health, in EUROPEAN COMPETITION LAW ANNUAL 2005: THE INTERACTION BETWEEN COMPETITION
LAW AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW

609, 625 (Clause-Dieter Ehlermann & Isabela Atanaslu eds., Hart

Publishing 2005).
28 See ALISON JONES & BRENDA SUFRIN, EC COMPETITION LAW: TEXT, CASES AND MATERIALS

570 (3d ed.,

2007).
29 See John Temple Lang, Anticompetitive Non-Pricing Abuses Under Europeanand NationalAntitrust Law, in
INTERNATIONAL ANTITRUST LAW & POLICY: FORDHAM CORP. L. INST.
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would be recognized "even if the input is a competitive advantage of a kind which has never
previously been marketed or licensed by any company, and which it would not be economi30
cally rational to license to a direct competitor."
As for the first condition - the "new product" rule - the Court first formulated, in
general terms, a premise whereby,
in the balancing of the interest in protection of the intellectual property
right and the economic freedom of its owner against the interest in protection of free competition, the latter can prevail only where refusal to grant a
license prevents the development of the secondary market to the detriment
31
of consumers.
Subsequently, the European judge developed this concept, ruling that:
[T]he refusal by an undertaking in a dominant position to allow access to a
product protected by an intellectual property right, where that product is
indispensable for operating on a secondary market, may be regarded as
abusive only where the undertaking which requested the license does not
intend to limit itself essentially to duplicating the goods or services already
offered on the secondary market by the owner of the intellectual property
right, but intends to produce new goods or services not offered by the
32
owner of the right and for which there is a potential consumer demand.
THE MICROSOFT CASE
On September 15, 1998, the Vice President of Sun Microsystems Inc., an American
manufacturer of servers and server operating systems, asked Microsoft to make them aware of
the interoperability information needed to enable their operating system (Solaris) to communicate with the Windows operating system, designed and marketed by Microsoft. 33 The interoperability information consists of the complete specifications for all the protocols
implemented in Windows, which are used by the operating system to send files to other serv34
ers or printers or to store files in directories.
Microsoft, by letter dated October 6, 1998, replied that such information was already
published and available to any software developer via the Microsoft Developer Network, from
which Sun had already purchased 32 licenses. Microsoft stated that a lecture was taking place
the following week, during which the issue of interoperability information between operating
systems produced by different software companies would be discussed.
On December 10, 1998, Sun filed a claim with the European Commission under
Article 3 of EC Regulation 17/1962, 35 complaining of Microsoft's refusal to make them
aware of the interoperability information between its server operating system and the Win30 See id. at 307.
31 IMS Health, 2004 E.C.R. 1-5039, 1 48.
32 Id. 49.

33Microsoft, 2007 E.C.R. 11-3601, 1 2.
34 Id. 9 37.
35 Council Regulation 17/62, First Regulation Implementing Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty, 1962 O.J. (L 13)
204, now substituted by Council Regulation 1/2003, 2003 O.J. (L 1) 1.
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dows operating system. 36 In August, 2000, the Commission required from Microsoft information on the interoperability of Windows with other operating systems, which Microsoft
37
provided in November of that same year.
In the meantime, the Commission, on its own initiative, started examining the Windows 2000 operating system installed on personal computers and servers. It also investigated
the installation of Media Player38 in the Windows operating system. Afterward, the Commission sent Microsoft a second notice in which it reiterated its previous comments regarding
interoperability between operating systems and it required information on the integration be39
tween Media Player and the Windows operating system.
On March 24, 2004, the European Commission adopted a decision establishing that
Microsoft infringed Article 82 of the EC Treaty and committed an abuse of dominant position.
The Commission imposed a fine of over 497 million Euros. 40 The Commission sanctioned,
inter alia,4 1 Microsoft's refusal to make public to its competitors some "interoperability information" and to authorize its use for the development and distribution of competing products
on the market for work group server operating systems during the period between October,
1998 and March 24, 2004. To remedy its wrongdoing, the Commission required Microsoft to
disclose to any company wishing to develop and deploy operating systems for a work group
42
server the "specifications" of its client-server and server-to-server communication protocols.
In June, 2004, Microsoft sought an annulment before the CFI of the Commission's
decision or, alternatively, a substantial reduction of the fine imposed. 43 Regarding specifically the refusal to supply information on interoperability, the Court first confirmed that the
necessary degree of interoperability taken into account by the Commission was justified 4 and
that there was no inconsistency between that degree and the remedy imposed by the Commission.4 5 It also noted that the Commission defined the interoperability information as relating
to a detailed technical description of certain rules of interconnection and interaction between
36 Microsoft Decision, 4 C.M.L.R. 965,

3.

37 Id. 4.

38 Windows Media Player is a program for playing audio and video designed and developed by Microsoft
itself.
39 Microsoft Decision, 4 C.M.L.R. 965, 15.
40 Id. 1080
41 The second conduct sanctioned by the Commission concerned the sale of Windows Media Player in
conjunction with the Windows operating system for PCs. The Commission believed that this practice breached
competition in the market for media players. By way of remedy, the Commission required Microsoft to make
available for sale a version of Windows without Windows Media Player.
42 To assist the Commission in ensuring that Microsoft complied with the decision, an independent trustee was
designated by the Commission, who was chosen from a list provided by Microsoft. His main duty was to
monitor the performance of the obligations imposed on Microsoft and to report the Commission on any abuse.
The costs associated with the trustee, including his remuneration, should have been borne by Microsoft.
43 Case T-201104, Microsoft Corp. v. Comm'n., 2007 E.C.R. 11-3601. See also David Howarth and Kathryn
McMahon, Windows has Performed an Illegal Operation:The Court of First Instance's Judgment in Microsoft
v. Commission, 29 EuR. COMM'N. L. REv. 117 (2008); J. Langer, The Court of First Instance's Microsoft
Decision: Just an Orthodox Ruling in an On-Orthodox Case, 35(2) LEGAL ISSUES ECON. INTEGRATION 183
(2008); Robert Mold~n, Mandatory Supply of Interoperability Information: The Microsoft Judgment, 9 EUR.
Bus. ORG. L. REv. 305 (2008); I. Eagles & L. Longdin, Microsoft's Refusal to Disclose Software
InteroperabilityInformation and the Court of First Instance, 5 EUR. INTELL. PRO. L. REv. 205 (2008).
44 See Microsoft, 2007 E.C.R. 11-3601,
207-42.
45 See id. 9 258-60.
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various instances of Windows work group server operating systems and Windows client PC
46
operating systems running on different computers in a Windows work group network.
The Court emphasized that the Commission explicitly insisted on the fact that
Microsoft's improper denial concerned only the specifications of certain protocols, not elements of the source code, and that it had no intention of ordering Microsoft to disclose such
information to its competitors.47 The Court further considered that the Commission's aim
was to remove the obstacle that Microsoft had constructed for its competitors by providing an
insufficient degree of interoperability with the existing Windows architecture. Removal of
this obstacle was necessary to enable Microsoft's rivals to offer work group server operating
systems that could differ from the one developed by Microsoft on important parameters.
Microsoft argued that the degree of interoperability set by the Commission was aimed at
allowing its competitors' server operating system to operate in every respect like a Windows
system. The crux of Microsoft's argument, therefore, was that its competitors would be able
to clone or reproduce its products. 48 Ultimately, the Court rejected this argument.
With regard to the refusal to provide information relating to interoperability, the
Court recalled that, according to the previously mentioned settled jurisprudence, although undertakings are, in principle, free to choose their trading partners, a refusal to supply that comes
49
from a company in a dominant position may constitute an abuse in certain circumstances.
To be classified as an abuse, an IPR owner's refusal to grant to a third party a license to use a
product must meet three conditions: a) the refusal must relate to a product or service indispensable to the exercise of a commercial activity on a neighboring market; b) the refusal must be
such as to exclude any effective competition on that market; and c) the refusal must prevent
50
When all of
the appearance of a new product for which there is potential consumer demand.
these circumstances exist, the refusal to grant a license can constitute an abuse of dominant
position, unless it is objectively justified. In this case, the Court found that the Commission
did not commit any error in finding that these circumstances were met. It concluded that the
Commission correctly determined that it was necessary, for competing work group server
operating systems to be validly marketed, that the latter be able to interoperate with the Windows architecture on an equal footing with Windows operating systems. The absence of such
interoperability would have the effect of strengthening the competitive position of Microsoft
51
in the market and threatened to eliminate the competition.
The Court also found that the circumstances concerning the emergence of a new
product should be evaluated in the context of Article 82(2)(b) of the EC Treaty. It held that
the Commission's finding that Microsoft's refusal limited technical development to the detri52
ment of consumers was not clearly erroneous under this provision.
Finally, the Court rejected Microsoft's argument that its refusal was objectively justified because the technology in question was protected by IPRs. The Court noted that such a
justification would render ineffective the principles set by the previous jurisprudence on this

46

See id. 206.

41 See id.

203-04.

1 234-42.
49 See id. 1 319-36.
10 See id. 1 332.
51 See id. 1 421-22.

48 See id.

52 See id. 1 643-65.
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issue. 5 3 Moreover, the Court ruled that Microsoft had not shown that, if forced to disclose
information relating to interoperability, Microsoft would suffer a major negative impact upon
its incentives to innovate. 54 The Court confirmed, therefore, the decision concerning the disclosure of interoperability information.
The Question of Interoperability
The CFI examined the issue of interoperability through four basic steps in its decision: a) the "indispensability" of interfaces and protocols for interoperability on the secondary
market; b) the presence of a "risk" of elimination of competition on the secondary market; c)
the "exceptional circumstances" that allow the refusal to license to be considered a violation
of Article 82; and d) the absence of an objective justification for that refusal.
With regard to the first issue, the Court's decision was based upon the Commission's
remarks, according to which the Windows operating system represents a defacto standard for
work group servers and that they constitute a separate market. 55 The Court, therefore, relied
upon the application of the essential facility doctrine. The CFI did not detect errors in the
reconstruction of the Commission whereby Windows operating system was seen as a necessary passage for the accessibility to the market of work servers, accepting the idea that the
information sought was essential to ensure interoperability. 56 Finally, the CFI confirmed the
theory of leveraging: the essential infrastructure in the first market (Windows operating system) was used as a facilitator to gain significant market power in the secondary market for
57
work group servers.
As for the second point, it is worth recalling that, according to the Commission, to
find an abuse under Article 82 of the EC Treaty, it is sufficient to prove that the refusal to
supply can generate a mere risk of elimination of competition on the secondary market.5 8 In
response, Microsoft objected, noting that in cases relating to the use of IPRs, the case law
adhered to a more stringent test based on the demonstration of a high probability that all
competition is eliminated on the secondary market. 59 The Court, in agreeing with the Commission, considered these claims to be a mere distinction in terminology. According to the
Court, the expressions "risk of elimination of competition" and "likely to eliminate competition" reflected the same idea, namely that:
Article 82 EC does not apply only from the time when there is no more, or
practically no more, competition on the market. If the Commission were
required to wait until competitors were eliminated from the market, or until
their elimination was sufficiently imminent, before being able to take action under Article 82 EC, that would clearly run counter to the objective of
that provision, which is to maintain undistorted competition in the common

5' See id.
54 See id.
"

56

688-90.

697.
See id. 32.
See id. In1236-38.

57 See id. In 1344-52.
58 See id. If 560-63.
'9 See id.

560.
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market and, in particular, to safeguard the competition that still exists on
60
the relevant market.
Upon deeper analysis, the difference between the test of possibility and probability
(encompassed respectively in the language "risk" and "likely") is not purely terminological,
but reveals a different standard of proof. Nonetheless, a different outcome would have been
unlikely, since the argument of the Court (that the test of Article 82 does not concern proof of
the effects, but the existence of conduct that could produce the effects) is consistent with EC
61
settled jurisprudence.
With regard to the "exceptional circumstances" that allow consideration of the refusal to license as a violation of Article 82(c), the decisions in Magill and IMS outlined a "new
product" rule, an additional requirement peculiar to cases involving IPRs. The test of exceptional circumstances implies that the entity requesting a license must offer a new product for
which there is a potential consumer demand and must also demonstrate that the refusal to
license will result in the elimination of all competition in the secondary market. Microsoft
relied upon a rigorous analysis based upon the "new product" rule, complaining that competitors simply wanted to replicate the functionality of Windows. In contrast, the Commission
continued along the line of its previous arguments by maintaining that the definition of "new
product" included a product that is not the mere duplication of existing goods or services, but
had to present some significant elements as a result of research and development efforts carried out by the entity requesting the license. The Commission emphasized that the right context for analyzing the refusal to grant a license was Article 82(b), which considers the
limitation of technical development to the detriment of consumers to be abusive. 62 The Commission also reiterated that Microsoft's refusal to provide the essential information should be
considered an impediment of interoperability in the field of information technology and an
obstruction to follow-on innovation on the secondary market. 63 In addition, the Commission
highlighted the fact that, in this case, Microsoft was not merely opposing a refusal to a new
64
entrant (as in Magill and IMS), but was interrupting an existing line of conduct.
The CFI accepted almost all of the Commission's arguments. With regard to the new
product test, the Court recalled that, in Magill, the requirement in question was meant to
protect consumers from the harm provoked by hostility to the commercialization of a completely new product, whilst, in IMS, harm to consumers resulted from the failure to develop a
secondary market. The Court then concluded that the requirement of the new product, as
developed in Magill and IMS, cannot be considered the only parameter to determine whether a
refusal to license is likely to cause injury to consumers within the meaning of Article 82(b).
The court reasoned so since that provision refers not only to limits imposed to the production
and the markets, but to technical developments as well. 65 Therefore, according to the CFI, the
Commission had correctly shown that Microsoft's refusal had the consequence of preventing
rivals from developing their products.
60 Id. 1561.
61 See, e.g., Case 85n76, Hoffmann-La Roche & Co. AG v. Comm'n, 1979 E.C.R. 461,

91; Case 322/81, NV

Nederlandsche Banden Industrie Michelin v. Comm'n, 1983 E.C.R. 3461, 70; Case T-203/01, Manufacture
Franqaise des Pneumatiques Michelin v. Comm'n, 2003 E.C.R. I-4071, 239.
62 See Microsoft, 2007 E.C.R. 11-3601, $ 632.
63 See id.
64 See id. 308.
65 Id. 1%643-65.
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Lastly, the Court rejected Microsoft's argument that requiring it to make a given
technology available to its competitors would reduce its incentive to develop the technology.
The Court held firmly that such an argument could be advanced only under "objective justification[s]." 66 The Court also ruled that, once the elements of an abuse are ascertained, it is
upon the dominant firm to invoke an objective justification and to support it with arguments
and evidence. In this case, the Court found that Microsoft did not meet this burden. According to the judge in Microsoft, Microsoft's arguments appeared vague, general, and purely
theoretical. 67 It merely stated that disclosure "would ...eliminate future incentives to invest
in the creation of more intellectual property" without specifying the technologies and products
68
to which it was referring.
The Court held that the Commission's conclusion was based upon founded factual
evidence, there was no reason to believe that Microsoft products would have been cloned, and
the disclosure of information for interoperability is a widespread practice in the field. 69 The
Court also referred to the recitals of Directive 91/250/EEC, 70 wherein it is envisaged "the
application of the competition rules under Articles [81] and [82] of the Treaty if a dominant
''7 1
Fisupplier refuses to make information available which is necessary for interoperability.
nally, the Court concluded that Microsoft could not "seriously maintain that it was not aware
' 72
that it was infringing Article 82 EC."
The jurisprudential approach to the problem of interoperability has been recently
codified and transposed into the European legislative framework with Directive 2009/24 on
the Legal Protection of Computer Programs 73 . The Directive acknowledges that the unauthorized reproduction, translation, adaptation or transformation of the form of the code in which a
copy of a computer program has been made available constitutes an infringement of the exclusive rights of the author 74 . However, Article 6(1) of the Directive provides for a derogatory
regime, whereby "[t]he authorisation of the rightholder shall not be required where reproduction of the code and translation of its form . . . are indispensable to obtain the information
necessary to achieve the interoperability of an independently created computer program with
other programs." Such an exception is subject to three conditions set out in Article 6(1),
namely that: a) those acts are performed by the licensee or by another person having a right to
use a copy of a program; b) the information necessary to achieve interoperability has not
previously been readily available; and c) those acts are confined to the parts of the original
program which are necessary in order to achieve interoperability. A limitation to this derogatory regime is laid down in Article 6(2), which provides that the information obtained through
the application of Article 6(1) shall only be used or disclosed to achieve the interoperability of

66 See id. 659.
67 Id.
697-98.
68 Id. 689 (citation omitted).
700- 702.
69 See id.
70 Microsoft, 2007 E.C.R. 11-3601, 1313.
71 Council Directive 91/250/EEC, on the Legal Protection of Computer Programs, 1991 O.J. (L 122) 42, 43.
72 Microsoft, 2007 E.C.R. 11-3601, 1313.
73 Directive 2009/24/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of April 23, 2009, on the Legal
Protection of Computer Programs, 2009 O.J. (L 111) 16. Directive 2009/24/EC replaces and expressly repeals
Directive 91/250/EEC. See id. Art. 10.
74 See id. Recital (15) and Art. 4.
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the independently created computer programs and shall not be employed for the development,
75
production or marketing of substantially similar computer programs.
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS
AND ARTICLE 82 EC TREATY IN THE LIGHT OF
THE RECENT JURISPRUDENCE
Generally, the theme of the relationship between IPRs and antitrust laws is featured
by the opposition of two theoretical approaches. 76 Under the first orientation, the contrast
between the monopoly of IPRs and the protection of competition would only be superficial, or
would occur only in the short term. In the long term, in fact, exclusive rights would benefit
the competition, both by encouraging production and allowing the movement of the protected
77
goods.
According to the second orientation, there is an intrinsic tension between the two
sets of rules. While both are ultimately aimed at increasing the general welfare, they do so in
conflicting ways, and thus create a difficult to solve trade-off. This tension is summarized by
the following dilemma: "[I]s it better to have less innovation widely exploited or to limit the
present exploitation in exchange for greater innovation in the future?" 78
European case law appears, in principle, to move toward a middle position. As
noted, "while competition law may ultimately trump IP law, the approach of the [European
Court of Justice] is one of seeking to maintain the integrity of the two regimes." 79 From this
perspective stems the assumption, often recalled by the Court, that an IPR does not per se
s0
confer market power.
Indeed, the notion of monopoly used in IP law (according to the common definition
of property rights as limited monopolies) does not coincide with that of monopoly used in
competition law (or, rather, of dominance or market power). For the two concepts to overlap,
it is necessary that the relevant market coincides with the product protected by IPRs. Therefore, the sphere of the jus excludendi conferred by IPRs must coincide with the sphere of
75 This point markedly echoes Microsoft's argument regarding the unlawfulness of competitors' behaviors
intended to clone or reproduce its products. The Court dismissed this argument on the basis of a lack of
evidence. See Microsoft, 2007 E.C.R. 11-3601, I 234-42.
76 See, e.g., See, e.g., Daniel Kanter, IP and Compulsory Licensing on Both Sides of the Atlantic - an
Appropriate Antitrust Remedy or a Cutback on Innovation?, 27(7) EUR. COMPETITION L. REV. 351 (2006);
Imelda Maher, The Interface of EC Competition Law and Intellectual Property Rights: the Essential and the
Creative, in 7 CAMBRIDGE YEARBOOK OF EUROPEAN LEGAL STUDIES 189 (John Bell & Claire Kilpatrick eds.,
2005); Cyril Ritter, Refusal to Deal and "Essential Facilities": Does Intellectual Property Require Special
Deference Compared to Tangible Property?, 28 WORLD COMPETITION 281 (2005).
77 The movement of the protected goods would be otherwise impossible in the absence of a definition of the
original ownership. See William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Copyright Law, 18
J.LEGAL STUD. 325. 348 (1989).
78 Francesco Denozza, Consumer Transaction Costs at the Intersection of Antitrust and Intellectual Property,
in SIENA MEMOS AND PAPERS ON LAW AND EcONOMIcS 2, 3 (2003), available at http://www.unisi.it/lawand
economics/simple/017_Denozza.pdf.
79 Maher, supra note 76, at 193.
80 See, e.g., Case 24/67 Parke, Davis & Co. v. Probel, 1968 E.C.R. 55; Opinion of Advocate General Mischo,
Case 238/87, AB Volvo v. Erik Veng (UK) Ltd., 1988 E.C.R. 6211. See also Alexandros Stratakis,
ComparativeAnalysis of the US and EU Approach and Enforcement of the Essential FacilitiesDoctrine, 27(8)
EUR. COMPETITION L. REV. 434 (2006).
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market power. If, on the contrary, that "good" is part of a wider market, and there exist
substitutes to an appreciable extent, the right does not confer any monopoly power in the
sense that this term is given in competition law. 8 Furthermore, dominance in the relevant
market does not fall, as such, under the prohibition of Article 82 of the EC Treaty, but rather
its "abuse" is to be forbidden. 82 In Magill, the Court of Justice reiterated this principle with
regard to the exercise of IPRs, coining the exceptional circumstances formula, which has been
strongly followed in subsequent jurisprudence. 83 The exercise of a right conferred by law
does not normally constitute an abuse of dominant position. Indeed, one can say that the fact
that a particular conduct falls within the powers that the law itself reserves to the IPR holder
can represent a presumption of legality. However, such presumption, as said, can be rebutted
84
in "exceptional cases."
The Magill case is subject to two possible interpretations. The first is in terms of
"peculiarity," meaning that that the judgment has been driven by the presence of atypical facts
and therefore not easily replicable. This belief is well expressed in the Opinion of Advocate
General Jacobs in Bronner.85 Under the second interpretation, the Magill judgment is the
result of an ordinary application of Article 82 of the EC Treaty. In this perspective, the
principle affirmed by the Court would not have been dictated by the peculiarities of the case,
but instead would fit in a precise jurisprudential orientation, concerning the anticompetitive
conduct of refusing to supply, of which the case at issue represents a simple application in the
field of IP.
In the IMS case, the applicant appealed to the CFI to annul the decision and for its
precautionary suspension. The request for suspension was upheld, and the order of the president of the CFI rejected the Commission's arguments. First, the Commission's decision
would have departed from previous case law in holding that the denial of a license entailed a
breach of Article 82 even if it did not prevent "the appearance of a new product on a market
separate from that on which the undertaking in question [was] dominant."' 86 Also, "the public
interest invoked by the Commission in the contested decision relates, in substance, primarily
81 See Hedvig K.S. Schmidt, Article 82's "Exceptional Circumstances" that Restrict Intellectual Property
Rights, 23(5) EuR. COMPETITION L. REv. 210 (2002); ALISON JONES & BRENDA SuFRIN, EC COMPETITION LAW:
TEXT, CASES AND MATERIALS 763 (2d ed., Oxford University Press 2004). See also Opinion of Advocate

General Poiares Maduro, Case C-109/03, KPN Telecom BV v. Onafhankelijke Post en Telecommunicatie
Autoriteit (OPTA), 2004 E.C.R. 1-11273; Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs, Case C-7/97, Oscar Bronner
GmbH & Co. KG v. Mediaprint Zeitungs- und Zeitschriftenverlag GmbH & Co. KG, 1998 E.C.R. 1-7791.
82 On the concept of abusive conduct, see Case 85/76, Hoffmann-La Roche & Co. AG v. Comm'n, 1979
E.C.R. 461,
88-91.
83 See Magill, 1995 E.C.R. 1-743, 50. See also Case T-198/98, Micro Leader Bus. V. Comm'n, 1999 E.C.R.
11-3989, 156.
84 Magill, 1995 E.C.R. 1-743, 150.
85 See Bronner, 1998 E.C.R. 1-7791. The Advocate general stated that "[t]he ruling in Magill can in my view be
explained by the special circumstances of that case which swung the balance in favor of an obligation to license.
First, the existing products, namely individual weekly guides for each station, were inadequate, particularly
when compared with the guides available to viewers in other countries. The exercise of the copyright therefore
prevented a much needed new product from coming on to the market. Secondly, the provision of copyright
protection for program listings was difficult to justify in terms of rewarding or providing an incentive for
creative effort. Thirdly, since the useful life of program guides is relatively short, the exercise of the copyright
provided a permanent barrier to the entry of the new product on the market." Id. T 63.
86 Order of the President of the Court of First Instance, Case C-48 1/01 P (R), NDC Health GmbH & Co. KG
and NDC Health Corporation v. Comm'n of the Eur. Cmtys. and IMS Health Inc., 2002 E.C.R. 1-3401, 9 105.
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to the interests of the applicant's competitors." 87 Therefore, according to the CFI President
Vesterdorf:
It cannot ... be excluded that the balance of interests effected in the contested decision by the Commission, which seems to equate the interests of
NDC... with the interests of competition.., ignores the primary purpose
of Article 82 EC, which is to prevent the distortion of competition, and
especially to safeguard the interests of consumers, rather than to protect the
88
position of particular competitors.
President Vesterdorf accepted, in practice, the thesis of Magill as being unique: the
national databases did not represent an obstacle for product innovation in the downstream
market. On the other hand, there was no unsatisfied need on the part of consumers. The
unsatisfied need was instead on the part of competitors, but these are not usually protected by
89
antitrust laws.
The conclusion presented by Advocate General Tizzano in the IMS case had a particular role in the CFI's decision in the Microsoft case. The Advocate General, in fact, underlined the importance of the interests of consumers to the development of the industry through
the diversification of products. 90 It is indeed the promotion of these consumer interests that
would allow the court to identify a general rule, which the judge failed to proclaim explicitly
in Magill: if the legal system assigned to the protection of IP an incentive to innovate, it would
be contradictory to think that this role should be pursued at the expense of the general interest
in the development of different and better products. While claiming to agree with the conclusions of the Advocate General, the Court diverged with regard to this crucial point. Although
the Advocate General referred to "goods or services of a different nature which, although in
competition with those of the owner of the right, answer specific consumer requirements not
satisfied by existing goods or services," the Court stated that the refusal may be considered
abusive only when the undertaking which requested the license has the intention "to produce
new goods or services not offered by the owner of the right and for which there is a potential
consumer demand." 9 1

87 Id.

145.

88 Id.

It must be noted, however, that a large debate arose in the recent years about the real goals of competition
law in Europe, with particular reference to the role of competitors and the protection provided them by
competition laws. Ex multis, see Eleanor M. Fox, We Protect Competition, You Protect Competitors,26 WORLD
CoMPETMoN 149 (2003).
90 Opinion of Advocate General Tizzano, Case C-418/01, IMS Health GmbH & Co. OHG v NDC Health
GmbH & Co. KG, 2004 E.C.R. 1-5039. In this Opinion, the Advocate General had the occasion to express his
idea whereby:
[T]he refusal to grant a license may be deemed abusive only if the requesting undertaking
does not wish to limit itself essentially to duplicating the goods or services already
offered on the secondary market by the owner of the intellectual property right but
intends to produce goods or services of a different nature which, although in competition
with those of the owner of the right, answer specific consumer requirements not satisfied
by existing goods or services.
Id. 62.
9'IMS Health, 2004 E.C.R. at 49.
89
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The Court did not refer to products or services with different characteristics compared to the existing ones, but to new products per se, in the sense that they were never
offered to consumers. Moreover, in the context of IPRs, the refusal to allow access to an
essential resource becomes relevant for purposes of antitrust law only if the firm that requests
the access intends to open a new product market. It must be underlined that this particular
feature seems to run against legal certainty, as the legality of the IP owner's behavior is
assessed on the basis of the requesting firm's conduct after the license is provided. Obviously, the IP owner cannot be aware of the requesting firm's true intent before the license is
conferred. A natural solution to this question would be to grant a license that encompasses a
condition whereby the information provided under the license agreement are used exclusively
to open a new product market.
Magill thus remains, according to the IMS judgment, a special case, and therefore is
not likely to provide principles of ordinary application. Rather, as pointed out by Advocate
General Jacobs in his opinion a few months after the IMS ruling, "some exceptional harm to
competition must be shown" in order to recognize an obligation to deal on the part of a
92
company whose dominance stems from the ownership of IPRs.
However, in the Microsoft Decision,9 3 the Commission maintained a different approach, concurring with the interpretation that Magill does not constitute a special case. After
having classified the Magill case in the framework of previous rulings (namely Commercial
Solvents,94 Telemarketing,95 Volvo, 96 Ladbroke,97 and Bronner98 ), the Commission observed
that:
[O]n a general note, there is no persuasiveness to an approach that would
advocate the existence of an exhaustive checklist of exceptional circumstances and would have the Commission disregard a limine other circumstances of exceptional character that may deserve to be taken into account
99
when assessing a refusal to supply.
In addition, the Commission noted that:
There is no reason why a refusal to supply an undertaking that has an interest in entering the market should be treated differently to a refusal to supply a company that is already present in the market. In Magill, for instance,
the company to which supply was refused was not competing in the market
that was being monopolized - precisely because such supply had been
refused. 100
92 Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs, Case C-53/03, Synetairismos Farmakopoion Aitolias & Akamanias
(Syfait) v. GlaxoSmithKline Plc., 2005 E.C.R. 1-4609, 66.
93 Case COMP/C-3/37.792, Microsoft, 4 C.M.L.R. 965 (2005).
94 Joined Cases 6 & 7/73, Istituto Chemioterapico Italiano SpA and Commercial Solvents Corporation v.
Comm'n, 1974 E.C.R. 225.
95 Case 311/84, Centre beige d'6tudes de march6 - T616marketing (CBEM) SA v. Compagnie luxembourgeoise
de t06diffusion SA and Information publicit6 Benelux SA, 1985 E.C.R. 3270.
96 Case 238/87, AB Volvo v. Erik Veng (UK) Ltd., 1988 E.C.R. 6232.
97 Case T-504/93, Tierc6 Ladbroke SA v. Comm'n, 1997 E.C.R. 11-927.
98 Bronner, 1998 E.C.R. 1-7791.
99 Microsoft Decision, 4 C.M.L.R. 965 (2005), 555.
100 Id. %562.
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Hence, according to the Commission, Magill represents an ordinary case of application of Article 82 of the EC Treaty.
In view of IMS, therefore, the decision made by the Commission in the Microsoft
case seemed destined to be annulled, because consumers already had a server operating system fully compatible with personal computer operating systems, those made by Microsoft
itself. At this point, the Commission intervened with the Discussion Paper on the Application
of Article 82 of the Treaty to Exclusionary Abuses (the "Discussion Paper"), published in
December, 2005. The Discussion Paper classified the cases of anticompetitive refusal to supply. 10 1 The first situation envisaged in the Discussion Paper concerns the termination of an
existing supply relationship. Once dominance is found, in the presence of restrictive effects
deriving from the refusal and in the lack of an objective justification, the conduct falls within
the prohibition of Article 82.102 The second situation pertains to the refusal to start supplying
an input. In such a case, in addition to the conditions set up for the previous hypothesis, it is
also necessary that the input at issue be indispensable to carry on normal economic activity in
the downstream market.103
The third situation concerns the refusal to license IPRs. Abusive conduct possibly
exists when the conditions described above are all fulfilled, and when the refusal to grant a
license prevents the development of the market, for which the license is an indispensable
input, to the detriment of consumers. Citing the IMS ruling, the Commission, following the
usual formula, explained that this can happen only when the undertaking requesting the license intends to produce new goods or services, which the IPR holder does not offer and for
which there is a potential consumer demand. However, the Commission also tried to formulate two adjustments. First, the Commission in its Discussion Paper provided that, when the
license is for a "follow-on innovation," the refusal may be unlawful even if the license is not
sought to incorporate the technology directly in clearly identifiable new products and services." ° Secondly, where the refusal relates to "information necessary for interoperability
between one market and another" and has a leverage effect whereby the firm is trying to
extend its dominance from one market to another, the Commission deemed that it might be
10 5
inappropriate to apply "the same high standard for intervention."'
It should be pointed out that the Commission, although via a nonbinding document,
appears to have eroded the principle expressed by the Court in the IMS case. This appears to
be an attempt to avoid the permanence of rules that could have led the Commission itself to be
unsuccessful in the Microsoft case. In Microsoft, the CFI chose a different path based upon a
particularly strong criterion of interpretation: the literal interpretation. In paragraph 647 of the
opinion, the Court noted that the abusive practices specifically provided for in Article 82(b) of
the EC Treaty encompass, in addition to the limitation of the production and markets, the
limitation of technological development. As the Court observed, the "new product" rule in
Magill and IMS was formulated with reference to cases in which the first two kinds of abuses
covered by the law were involved, not the third one (as in Microsoft).

101 DG Competition Discussion Paper on the Application of Article 82 of the Treaty to Exclusionary Abuses,

available at hnp://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/art82/discpaper2005.pdf, at 60.
102 See id.

9.2.1.

'03 See id. 1 9.2.2.
'o4 See id. 9.2.2.6.
101Id. 1 9.2.3.
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Microsoft's refusal to supply was qualified as abusive because it limits the development of the industry to the detriment of consumers, creating a lock-in effect, and preventing
companies from developing innovative products to compete with Microsoft operating systems. It is also interesting to note that the Court carefully considered the question of what
Microsoft's competitors wished to do once the information relating to interoperability was
obtained, in particular examining if there was a risk that they merely intended to clone
Microsoft operating systems. Indeed, a crucial factor in the decision was the outcome of that
consideration. This led to the observation that Microsoft's competitors would likely offer
different products, providing innovative features that were considered important by consumers
in terms of safety, reliability, ease of use and speed performance.1 0 6 In light of these circumstances, it is also possible to explain the apparent contradictory sentence at the end of paragraph 665, where the Court concluded its analysis by stating that "the circumstance relating to
the appearance of a new product is present in this case."' 1 7 The adjective "new," in fact, is to
be intended in terms of innovative technology rather than in terms of a novel product.
Therefore, it is illegitimate for an undertaking in a dominant position to refuse to
grant an input protected by IPRs when this prevents the marketing of a new product or of a
technologically innovative product that can replace an existing one. Although, in this latter
case, innovative products are positioned in direct competition with those already offered by
the dominant firm, the existing products are destined to be replaced in the consumers' preferences because of their superior quality in terms of technology.
As already mentioned, the significance of the fact that this situation could jeopardize
investments in research and development of the dominant undertaking, discouraging its further innovation in the future, can be evaluated as an objective justification for refusing the
license. However, according to the Court, such a justification can constitute a valid argument
only on the basis of what has been specifically alleged and proved at trial, while vague,
general and purely theoretical arguments cannot be considered. Such an orientation seems to
show a general position about the relationship between competition law and IP law, and appears to be in agreement with the theory of the fundamental tension between the two sets of
rules.
It is interesting to note that, one year before the Microsoft ruling, the Grand Chamber
of the Court of Justice ruled out any profile of tension between IP law and another set of rules,
which also have a constitutional importance in EC law, namely those relating to fundamental
rights.10 8 Therefore, the supreme judicial body of the EC seems oriented to a position in
favor of IPRs and inclined to avoid their limitation by rules and principles of other areas of the
106

See Microsoft, 2007 E.C.R. 1-3601, l 649-58. In reaching these crucial conclusions the Court relied upon

the conduct that Microsoft's competitors adopted in the past, when they had access to certain information
concerning Microsoft's products. See id. 654. The Court relied, in particular, on two examples that the
Commission provided in its decision: "PC NetLink" and "NDS for NT," involving, respectively, Sun
Microsystems Inc. and Novell Inc. In both cases, the innovative features and added value that competitors'
products brought to Windows work group networks were evident. See Microsoft Decision, 4 C.M.L.R. 965

(2005),

696.

107 Id. 665.
10s See Case C-479/04, Laserdisken ApS v. Kulturministeriet, 2006 E.C.R. 1-8113. On this occasion, the Court

held that, even if the prohibition of the so-called international exhaustion led to a restriction on the freedom to
receive information that is protected by Art. 10 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights, this
limitation would be justified by a pressing social need, which consisted in the necessity to protect intellectual
property rights, which are part of a more general right to property. See id. 65.
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law. This leads to some caution about the possibility that the principles expressed by the CFI
in Microsoft will be consolidated in EU jurisprudence.
CONCLUSIONS
The Court of Justice acknowledged, in principle, the legitimacy of the refusal to
grant a license as a characteristic expression of the right of exclusion enjoyed by IPR holders.
Essentially, the Court has attempted to reach a balance between different interests, reconciling
the exigency of control over IPRs and the protection of competition. The Court has done this
through the "exceptional circumstances" formula to justify, in limited cases, the imposition of
contract obligations.
As specified by the Court of Justice in Bronner, the requirements for the exclusion
of competition in the secondary market (given the indispensability of the resource to which
access is sought) and the lack of an objective justification follow case law on essential facilities. However, the new product requirement constitutes an additional element, which reflects
the attempt to preserve the incentive function of the IP system and allow impositions on IPR
holders to support further progress and innovation. In other words, in balancing the need to
protect IPRs and the interest in maintaining or promoting a competitive market structure, the
latter can prevail not only when the refusal does not merely prevent rivals from commercially
exploiting the protected product to compete with IPR holders, but when losses in terms of
efficiency and preventing or delaying the development of goods or services would result. To
reconcile IP and antitrust law, the Court of Justice resorted to the common feature of the two
disciplines: the desire to promote progress and innovation. This represents an objective pursued, in one system, by providing for the expectation to earn monopoly profits upon the
achievement of an innovation and, in the other, by encouraging the firms persistently to innovate themselves in order not to succumb to competitive pressure.
Following the decision of the CFI in the Microsoft case, it seems that the test of
exceptional circumstances has been expanded in its parameters with respect to how the criterion of the new product was set in IMS. In accordance with the language used in paragraph
664 of the Microsoft judgment, Article 82 covers not only conduct that can directly cause
damages to consumers, but also conduct which would indirectly produce the same result by
preventing the creation of effective competition. In addition, the new product requirement
does not necessarily entail the supply of an original creation on the market. In fact, the marketing of a product in competition with existing ones, but with different and improved technological features, can also satisfy the condition at issue.
On this question, it must be noted that part of the doctrine is inclined to look beyond
10 9
In
the boundaries of the exceptional circumstances listed in the Magill and IMS decisions.
particular, according to a doctrinaire approach, the use of antitrust laws to compel a license to
a dominant firm could be the most effective way to remedy a situation of nearly impenetrable
closure of the market caused by the overlap of the protection offered by the IP system. Such
market closure would preclude the commercial exploitation of the protected goods or services
by the competing operators. In line with this doctrine, competition rules would also mitigate
109 See generally Burton Ong, Building Brick Barricades and Other Barriers to Entry: Abusing a Dominant
Position By Refusing to License Intellectual Property Rights, 26 EUR. COMPErITION L. REv. 215 (2005)
(arguing that there are a variety of ways in which intellectual property rights may be abused quite apart from the
factual scenario in Magill).
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the negative consequences of network effects, which hinder the introduction and spread of
alternative products' 10 However, while some authors defend the role of competition rules as
an effective tool to protect the competitiveness of markets, another part of the doctrine expressed doubts about the opportunity to intervene with the instruments of antitrust law to
suppress the mere refusal to license, propounding a presumption of legality where IPRs are
involved1 1 or suggesting to explore alternative scenarios, such as the use of tools and institu1 12
tions which are endogenous to the IP system.

110 GUSTAVO GHIDINI, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND COMPETITION LAW: THE INNOVATION NEXUS 103 (2006).
111 HERBERT HOVENKAMP, MARK D. JANIS, MARK A. LEMLEY & CHRISTOPHER R. LESLIE, IP AND ANTITRUST:
AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES APPLIED TO INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW

§

13.3f (2011 & Supp.

2010).
112 See Burton Ong, Anti-competitive Refusals to Grant Copyright Licences: Reflections on the IMS Saga, 26
EUR. INTELL. PROP. REv. 505, 507-08 (2004).
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